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  Imagine	  a	   situation	   in	  which	  you	  had	   to	  design	  a	  physical	   agent	   that	   could	   collect	  information	  from	  its	  environment,	  then	  store	  and	  process	  that	  information	  to	  help	  it	  respond	   appropriately	   to	   novel	   situations.	   What	   kinds	   of	   information	   should	   it	  attend	  to?	   	  How	  should	  the	  information	  be	  represented	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  efficient	  use	  and	  re-­‐use?	  What	  kinds	  of	  constraints	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  would	  there	  be?	  There	  are	  no	  unique	  answers.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  need	  to	  be	  able	   to	  address	  problems	  of	  varying	  kinds	  and	  complexity	  can	  be	  met	  by	  different	  information	  processing	   systems.	  We	  also	  discuss	  different	  ways	   in	  which	   relevant	  information	   can	   be	   obtained,	   and	   how	   different	   kinds	   of	   information	   can	   be	  processed	  and	  used,	  by	  both	  biological	  organisms	  and	  artificial	  agents.	  We	  analyse	  several	  constraints	  and	  design	  features,	  and	  show	  how	  they	  relate	  both	  to	  biological	  organisms,	  and	  to	   lessons	  that	  can	  be	   learned	  from	  building	  artificial	  systems.	  Our	  standpoint	  overlaps	  with	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith	  (1992)	  in	  that	  we	  assume	  that	  a	  collection	  of	  mechanisms	   geared	   to	   learning	   and	   developing	   in	   biological	   environments	   are	  available	  in	  forms	  that	  constrain,	  but	  do	  not	  determine,	  what	  can	  or	  will	  be	  learnt	  by	  individuals.	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1 Introduction	  	  For	  what	  purposes	  do	  animals	  need	  to	  acquire	  and	  use	  information?	  At	  one	  extreme	  organisms	   are	   merely	   acted	   on	   by	   the	   environment,	   which	   provides	   them	   with	  nutrients	   and	   toxins,	   and	   subjects	   them	   to	   various	   forces	   and	   abiotic	   conditions	  (such	  as	  temperature,	  pressure,	  and	  humidity).	  Such	  organisms	  can	  benefit	  or	  suffer	  as	  a	  result,	  but	  their	  ability	  to	  alter	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  conditions	  is	  severely	  limited.	  At	   another	   extreme,	   organisms	   can	   act	   on	   the	   environment,	   by	   planning	   and	  performing	  actions	  of	  varying	  kinds	  and	  degrees	  of	  complexity	  to	  avoid	  future	  harm	  or	  achieve	   future	  gain.	   In	   these	  circumstances,	   selection	  of	  behaviour	  requires	   the	  use	  of	  information.	  There	  are	  enormously	  diverse	  types	  of	  information	  and	  types	  of	  information	  processing	  capabilities.	  	  In	   this	  paper,	  we	  discuss	  some	  examples	   in	   the	  middle	  of	   this	  range	  of	  organisms,	  pose	   some	   new	   questions	   and	   suggest	   some	   new	   examples	   of	   information	  processing	   capabilities.	   We	   also	   illustrate	   how	   methods,	   problems,	   concepts	   and	  theories	  from	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (AI)	  can	  help	  biologists	  and	  psychologists	  make	  progress,	  advancing	  work	  already	  done	  by	  other	  authors	  (e.g.	  Gibson,	  1988;	  Gibson	  and	  Pick,	  2000;	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	  1992).	  This	   is	   just	  a	   tiny	  region	   in	  a	  huge	   field	  of	  research	   into	   the	   possible	   requirements	   and	   designs	   of	   different	   biological	  information	  processing	  systems.	  It	  intersects	  with	  existing	  work	  on	  motivation,	  play,	  learning,	   perception	   and	   development,	   and	   should	   help	   us	   understand	   how	   such	  systems	  have	  evolved	  and	  how	  they	  develop	  within	  an	  individual’s	  lifetime.	  	  	  
1.1 What	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  “information”?	  	  The	  word	  “information”	  has	  two	  main	  uses:	  	   a) Shannon's	   use	   (Shannon,	   1948)	   refers	   to	   a	   syntactic	   measure	   of	  communicable	  signals	  that	  ignores	  what	  the	  signals	  refer	  to,	  and	  b) The	  everyday	  use	   (Sloman,	  2011a)	   refers	   to	   semantic	   content	   that	   is	  about	  something	  that	  actually	  exists	  or	  could	  exist1.	  	  We	   use	   “information”	   (and	   related	   words,	   e.g.	   “concept”,	   “symbol”,	   “meaning”,	  “content”)	   in	  an	   informal	  way	  in	  sense	  b),	  as	  do	  most	  biologists,	  psychologists	  and	  engineers	   when	   discussing	   how	   organisms	   or	   machines	   (“agents”)	   can	   acquire	  factual	   information,	   construct	   theories,	   make	   predictions,	   draw	   conclusions,	   or	  adopt	   goals	   referring	   to	   something	   in	   the	   environment	   or	   within	   themselves.	  Information	  in	  sense	  b)	  matters	  to	  an	  organism	  or	  machine	  if	  the	  use	  of	  information	  can	  provide	  some	  benefit	  to	  them.	  	  In	   each	   case	   there	   must	   be	   an	   “information	   bearer”	   (representation)	   in	   the	  individual	  (e.g.	  chemical	  or	  neural	  signals),	  or	   in	  the	  environment	  (e.g.	  pheromone	  trails),	   or	   straddling	   the	   organism	   and	   its	   environment.	   New	   information	   bearers	  are	   often	   constructed	   in	   the	   process	   of	   using	   old	   information,	   such	   as	   when	  reasoning,	  planning,	  or	  forming	  goals.	  Information	  bearers	  need	  to	  be	  acted	  upon	  or	  used,	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  information	  content.	  	  
1.2 Plan	  for	  this	  paper	  	  We	  present	  some	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  intelligent	  agents,	  natural	  or	  artificial,	  that	  acquire	   and	   use	   information,	   showing	   how	   modes	   of	   thinking	   from	   different	  research	  fields	  can	  inform	  each	  other	  in	  designing	  working	  systems	  (e.g.	  robots)	  and	  in	   the	   search	   for	   explanations	   of	   learning	   and	   development	   in	   organisms.	   In	   this	  context	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  biological	  evolution	  and	  human	  engineers	  as	  playing	  similar	   roles,	   namely	   producing	   designs	   for	   an	   immature	   agent	   that	   can	   learn	   to	  cope	   with	   new	   environments,	   including	   situations	   not	   encountered	   by	   evolution	  (Dennett,	  1981;	  McCarthy,	  2008).	  	  
2 Theoretical	  requirements	  	  Imagine	  that	  you	  are	  given	  the	  task	  of	  designing	  a	  physical	  agent	   that	  will	  explore	  the	  surface	  of	  another	  planet,	   collecting	  and	  sending	   information	  as	   it	   travels	   (e.g.	  Mars	  Rovers2).	  It	  will	  be	  exposed	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  unpredictable	  conditions,	  so	  it	  cannot	   be	   pre-­‐programmed	   for	   every	  possible	   contingency	   (see	   Inglis	   et	   al.	   2001;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  are	  special	  cases	  of	  things	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  space-­‐time	  (numbers,	  theories	  etc.),	  but	  we	  will	  ignore	  those	  here.	  2	  http://marsrover.nasa.gov/mission/	  
McNamara	   and	   Houston,	   2009	   for	   further	   discussion).	   It	   will	   have	   to	   operate	  autonomously,	  so	   it	  must	   ‘decide’	   for	   itself	  where	   to	  go	  and	  what	   to	  do,	  as	  well	  as	  self-­‐diagnosing	   and	   fixing	   its	   own	   hardware	   or	   software	   problems.	  What	   are	   the	  general	   requirements	   of	   the	   task	   of	   exploration	   and	   learning?	   We	   sketch	   some	  answers	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	  designer	   of	   such	   a	   system	  who	   is	   inspired	  by	  biological	  evidence.	  These	  design	  considerations	  can,	  in	  turn,	  inspire	  developments	  in	   biological	   theorising,	   including	   suggesting	   new	   research	   questions	   (see	   for	  example	   Hawes,	   2011).	   Thus,	   in	   this	   section	   and	   Section	   3,	   we	  will	   illustrate	   our	  points	  with	  examples	  from	  a	  hypothetical	  artificial	  agent	  (the	  Mars	  Rover-­‐type	  robot	  mentioned	   earlier,	   hereafter	   ‘Rover’)	   and	   a	   biological	   agent,	   the	   New	   Caledonian	  crow	   (Corvus	   moneduloides,	   hereafter	   ‘NCC’).	   Since	   in	   both	   cases	   we	   still	   lack	  information	  about	   the	  precise	  mechanisms	  or	  computational	  processes	  underlying	  behaviour,	  these	  examples	  will	  be	  purely	  illustrative	  examples,	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  a	  broader	   theoretical	   point.	   We	   suggest	   linking	   the	   study	   of	   animal	   cognition	   with	  robotics	   research	   not	   because	   there	   are	   existing	   robots	   whose	   information	  processing	  mechanisms	  might	   be	   offered	   as	   explanations	   of	   animal	   competences,	  but	   because	   thinking	   like	   a	   robot	   designer	   about	  mechanisms	   required	   in	   a	   robot	  can	  suggest	  research	  questions	  regarding	  such	  mechanisms	  in	  animals.	  	  We	   proceed	   to	   specify	   some	   types	   of	   information	   that	   an	   animal	   or	  machine	   can	  acquire,	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  information	  can	  be	  used,	  and	  some	  transformations	  of	   stored	   information	   required	   to	   extend	   the	   generality	   and	   power	   of	   the	   agent's	  competences,	   in	  order	  to	   illustrate	  some	  of	   the	  variety	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  biological	  theory	  and	  AI	  overlap.	  	  	  
2.1 Persistence	  of	  information	  	  Some	   uses	   of	   information	   are	   transient:	   the	   individual	   acquires	   and	   immediately	  uses	  the	  information	  (e.g.	  while	  guiding	  grasping)	  without	  retaining	  any	  record	  of	  it.	  For	   other	   purposes,	   persistence	   of	   information	   is	   required.	   In	   this	   paper,	  we	  will	  mainly	   discuss	   types	   of	   information	   acquisition	   and	   exploration	   that	   result	   in	  persisting	  information	  content.	  	  If	   there	   is	  some	  change	  in	  the	  animal	  or	   in	  the	  external	  environment	  as	  a	  result	  of	  acquiring	   information	   (in	   other	   words,	   an	   “information	   bearer”	   is	   formed	   or	  modified	   as	   discussed	   in	   Section	   1.1),	   and	   it	   persists	   for	   even	   a	   short	   time,	   it	   can	  enable	  further	  uses	  of	  the	  information	  content.	  Without	  such	  persistence,	  detection	  of	   change	   is	   impossible.	   Persistence	   is	   also	  needed	   in	   order	   to	   re-­‐use	   information	  about	   enduring	   objects,	   properties,	   locations	   or	   processes,	   such	   as	   approaching	  predators,	   escaping	   prey,	   and	   so	   on.	   This	   persistent	   information	   can	   be	   re-­‐used	  through	  well-­‐known	  processes	  of	  learning	  such	  as	  classical	  or	  operant	  conditioning,	  or	   other	   probabilistic	   forms	   of	   learning	   (see	   Shettleworth,	   2010	   for	   an	   excellent	  discussion).	  For	  example,	  information	  related	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  food	  will	  become	  associated	  with	   the	   act	   of	   feeding	   such	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   this	   information	  will	  increase	  frequency	  of	  food-­‐seeking	  and	  feeding	  behaviours.	  	  
	  Rover	   would	   probably	   need	   persistent	   information	   of	   many	   kinds	   in	   order	   to	  increase	   its	   efficiency.	   For	   example,	   it	  would	   need	   to	   store	   information	   about	   the	  geographical	   locations	   of	   interesting	   samples,	   in	   order	   to	   return	   to	   that	   location	  later	  to	  collect	  the	  samples.	  Likewise,	  a	  NCC	  fishing	  for	  Cerambycid	  larvae	  in	  rotten	  logs	  might	  store	  information	  about	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  ‘frass’	  from	  the	  larvae	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  log,	  and	  re-­‐use	  that	  information	  to	  identify	  logs	  which	  contain	  active	  larvae.	  	  Persistent	   records	   can	   also	   enable	   discovery	   of	   useful	   abstractions.	   This	   is	   often	  referred	  to	  as	  “concept	  formation”	  (Martin,	  2007;	  Zentall,	  2008).	  Possession	  of	  such	  a	  concept	  allows	  new	  questions	  to	  be	  asked,	  and	  new	  goals	  or	  generalisations	  about	  some	   portion	   of	   the	   world	   to	   be	   formulated.	   More	   complex	   examples	   include	  discovery	  of	  useful	  relations	  (between,	  inside,	  touching:	  e.g.	  Bird	  and	  Emery,	  2010),	  functions	   (owner,	   initiator,	   container	   or	   location	   of),	   properties	   of	   matter	   (rigid,	  compliant,	   elastic,	   viscous:	   Bushnell	   and	   Boudreau,	   1993)	   and	   conditional	  properties	   (e.g.	   a	   compliant	   branch	   supports	   an	   orangutan's	   weight	   only	   if	   it	   is	  above	  a	  minimal	  stiffness).	   In	  some	  of	  these	  examples,	  classical	  models	  of	   learning	  will	  suffice	  to	  explain	  the	  observed	  behaviours,	  but	  in	  others,	  they	  are	  not	  sufficient	  (see	  Section	  2.2.2	  for	  further	  discussion).	  	  
2.2	  Coping	  with	  variability	  of	  the	  environment	  	  
2.2.1	  Pre-­‐configured	  competences	  	  However	  varied	  the	  environments,	  certain	  competences	  will	  have	  to	  be	  hard-­‐wired	  initially.	   Evolution	   provides	   many	   fully	   pre-­‐configured	   responses	   for	   different	  situations,	   such	   as	   feeding	   behaviours	   (e.g.	   suckling,	   begging,	   pecking).	  When	   the	  environment	   is	   too	  variable,	   evolution	   (like	  a	  human	  designer)	   cannot	  discover	   in	  advance	   suitable	   fixed	   responses	   to	   all	   needs	   in	   all	   situations.	   Instead,	   it	   provides	  mechanisms	   of	   learning	   and	   development	   that	   use	   information	   about	   the	  environment.	   This	   enables	   individuals	   to	   discover	   useful	   new	   actions,	   threats	   or	  opportunities	  (see	  Section	  2.2.2).	  However,	  these	  discoveries	  must	  start	  from	  some	  form	  of	  pre-­‐configured	  competences.	  	  Initial	   competences	   should	   be	   designed	   to	   make	   use	   of	   relevant	   environmental	  information,	  for	  instance	  detecting	  shapes	  of	  salient	  objects,	  their	  edges	  or	  contours,	  the	   curvature	   and	   orientation	   of	   surface	   fragments,	   and	   their	   texture.	   The	   exact	  properties	   will	   depend	   partly	   on	   what	   sensory	   apparatus	   the	   agent	   is	   equipped	  with,	  and	  on	  which	  features	  of	  objects	  or	  events	  are	  relevant	  to	  its	  ecological	  niche.	  Some	   objects'	   properties	   are	   difficult	   to	   determine	   without	   touching	   them.	   For	  example,	  if	  the	  agent	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	  hardness	  of	  a	  material,	  it	  could	  apply	  pressure	  to	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  object,	  while	  estimating	  weight	  would	  require	  it	  to	  lift	  the	   object	   (Flanagan	   and	   Wing,	   1997;	   Wing	   and	   Lederman,	   1998).	   Information	  gained	  in	  this	  way	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  metrical.	  For	  example,	  Rover	  might	  only	  need	  
two	  categories	  of	  weight	  (“light	  enough	  to	  carry”	  or	  “too	  heavy”)	  to	  enable	  decisions	  to	  be	  made	  about	  transporting	  samples.	  In	  other	  cases,	  orderings	  may	  suffice.	  	  Rover	  might	  need	  to	  be	  pre-­‐programmed	  with	  some	  basic	  competences	  (such	  as	  the	  ability	   to	  grasp	  a	   rock	  or	   to	  avoid	  exceeding	   its	   safe	   loading	   capacity),	   or	   it	  might	  damage	   itself	   irreparably,	   or	   fail	   to	   start	   collecting	   samples.	   However,	   it	   could	  extend	  those	  competences	  by	  learning	  more	  through	  exploration	  (e.g.	  learning	  how	  to	  identify,	  classify	  and	  select	  the	  most	  relevant	  rock	  samples).	  We	  know	  that	  while	  it	   can	   take	   several	   years	   for	   NCC	   to	   achieve	   adult-­‐level	   competency	   at	   tool	   use,	  juveniles	   perform	   stereotyped	   object	   manipulation	   patterns	   which	   appear	   to	   be	  precursors	  of	  adult	  tool	  behaviour	  (Kenward	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  Explaining	  how	  such	  discoveries	  can	  be	  made	  is	  very	  difficult.	  The	  methods	  of	  robot	  designers	  (identifying	  requirements,	  then	  generating,	  testing	  and	  debugging	  designs	  to	   meet	   those	   requirements)	   can	   usefully	   complement	   empirical	   research	   into	  observable	   behaviours	   and	   brain	   mechanisms	   (Webb,	   2001).	   For	   instance,	   a	  learning	   task	   can	  be	  broken	  down	   into	  many	   sub-­‐tasks.	  One	  of	   the	   tasks	   could	  be	  acquiring	   and	   storing	   information	   about	   the	   layout	   of	   the	   terrain,	   and	   the	  opportunities	   and	   dangers	   it	   affords.	   Various	   mechanisms	   for	   doing	   this	   both	   in	  animals	   and	   in	   robots	   have	   been	   studied	   (e.g.	   using	   SLAM	   algorithms	   for	  Simultaneous	  Localisation	  and	  Mapping;	  Bailey	  and	  Durrant-­‐Whyte,	  2006),	  but	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  further	  here.	  	  
2.2.2	  Reducing	  complexity	  by	  partitioning	  what	  has	  to	  be	  learnt	  	  Well-­‐designed	   learners	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   cope	   with	   many	   potential	   sources	   of	  variability	  and	  dynamic	  change	  in	  the	  environment	  (McNamara	  and	  Houston,	  2009;	  Shettleworth,	  2010).	  This	   includes	   spatio-­‐temporal	   changes	   caused	  by	   seasonal	  or	  climatic	   changes,	   geological	   changes,	   new	   behaviours	   of	   intra-­‐	   or	   inter-­‐specific	  competitors,	  variations	   in	   food	  availability	   (e.g.	  Houston	  et	  al.,	  1980;	  Kacelnik	  and	  Krebs,	   1985;	   Kacelnik	   and	   Todd,	   1992),	   co-­‐evolutionary	   arms	   races	   between	  predators	  and	  prey,	  and	  even	  niche	  construction	  (Sterelny,	  2007).	  	  Such	   learning	  processes	   are	   potentially	   combinatorially	   explosive	   (Bellman,	   1961;	  Perlovsky,	   1998)	   because	   of	   the	   huge	   search	   spaces	   involved	   in	   combining,	   for	  instance,	   different	   perceptual	   tests,	   motor	   sequences,	   and	  modulations	   of	   generic	  actions	   to	   fit	  specific	  shapes,	  sizes,	  and	  relations	  of	  objects	  and	  the	  processes	   they	  generate.	   In	   some	   circumstances	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   the	   animal	   to	   reduce	  computational	   load	  by	  pursuing	   a	   strategy	   of	   exploring	   the	   environment	   first	   and	  then	  switching	  to	  exploiting	   it.	  For	  example,	  Krebs	  et	  al.	   (1978)	  showed	  that	  great	  tits	   learning	   to	   choose	   between	   exploiting	   two	   foraging	   posts,	   each	   with	   a	   fixed	  probability	  of	   reward,	   stopped	  exploring	  and	  remained	  at	  one	   feeding	  post	  after	  a	  number	   of	   trials	   close	   to	   that	   predicted	   by	   the	   optimal	   solution.	   However,	   in	   this	  case,	  the	  environment	  was	  relatively	  simple	  and	  did	  not	  vary	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment:	   the	   situation	   is	   much	  more	   complex	   in	   non-­‐stationary	   environments	  
and	  other	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  (Cohen	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  In	  addition,	  a	  learning	  system	  needs	  to	  have	  good	  criteria	  for	  selecting	  things	  to	  attend	  to.	  Evolution	  seems	  to	  have	  provided	   many	   species	   with	   initial	   motivations	   and	   learning	   mechanisms	  specialised	   for	   restricted	   classes	   of	   environment	   (e.g.	   Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	   1992).	  Furthermore,	   in	   mechanisms	   of	   learning	   such	   as	   classical	   conditioning,	   animals	  attend	  to	  and	  learn	  about	  stimuli	  that	  convey	  information	  (e.g.	  Rescorla,	  1968).	  The	  selection	  of	  relevant	  information3	  to	  learn	  may	  be	  reduced	  further	  by	  decomposing	  an	  enormously	  varied	  environment	  into	  a	  collection	  of	  object	  “affordances”	  (action	  possibilities,	  or	  what	  the	  environment	  provides	  for	  the	  organism)	  and	  processes	  or	  “exploration	  domains”	  (“microdomains”	  in	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	  1992).	  We	  suggest	  that	  decomposition	   is	   achieved	   by	   perceptual	   and	   motor	   interactions	   with	   the	  environment	   during	   exploration	   (see	   Section	   4	   and	   Power,	   2000	   for	   an	   extended	  discussion).	  	  By	   selecting	   a	   physical	   subset	   of	   the	   environment,	   and	   systematically	   varying	  actions	   performed	   on	   it,	   the	   agent	   solves	   (temporarily)	   the	   problem	   of	   what	   to	  attend	   to	   and	   limits	   the	   range	   of	   phenomena	   within	   which	   patterns	   are	   sought.	  Some	   of	   the	   actions	  will	   involve	   only	   the	   agent’s	   body-­‐parts,	   for	   example	  moving	  limbs	  or	  digits,	   controlling	  eye	  movements	  or	  moving	   the	  whole	  body.	  Others	  will	  also	   involve	   selected	   objects,	   or	   types	   of	   object,	   such	   as	   repeatedly	   grabbing	   and	  pulling,	   pushing	   or	   twisting	   the	   same	   thing,	   or	   rearranging	   a	   group	   of	   objects.	   All	  this	  will	   only	  work	   if	   the	   agent	   starts	   off	  with	   perceptual	  mechanisms	   capable	   of	  detecting	   and	   recording	   the	   structures	   and	  motions	   produced	   by	   the	   exploratory	  actions	  (see	  Section	  2.2.1).	  	  For	  example,	  Rover	  might	  have	  to	  explore	  the	  effects	  of	  its	  own	  actions	  when	  it	  pushes	  piles	  of	  loose	  gravel-­‐like	  material	  around,	  separating	  movement	   of	   the	   material	   from	   self-­‐generated	   movement	   of	   its	   own	   body,	   thus	  discovering	  how	  to	  pile	  the	  material	  in	  a	  stable	  heap.	  	  Our	   anecdotal	   observations	   of	   animals	   and	   children	   suggest	   that	   exploration	  domains	  are	  often	  inter-­‐leaved,	  for	  example	  alternating	  between	  eating	  and	  playing	  with	   food.	  This	  allows	  knowledge	  of	  different	  domains	   to	  be	  developed	  roughly	   in	  parallel	   (Bushnell	   and	   Boudreau,	   1993).	   However,	   when	   switching	   domains,	   the	  individual	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  group	  items	  of	  information	  together	  according	  to	  the	  current	  domain	   involved.	  For	  example,	   for	  a	   tool	  using	  species	   like	  NCC,	  materials	  such	  as	  twigs	  and	  grass	  stems	  have	  one	  kind	  of	  affordance	  in	  the	  tool	  using	  domain	  (inserting	   into	   holes	   to	   retrieve	   food	   items)	   and	   other	   kinds	   of	   affordance	   when	  building	   a	   nest.	   For	   different	   species,	   the	   objects	   in	   the	   environment	   and	   their	  affordances	  will	  differ	  according	  to	  their	  ecological	  niche,	  but	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  common	   exploration	   mechanisms	   across	   species	   (Chappell	   and	   Sloman,	   2007;	  Sloman	  and	  Chappell,	  2005;	  see	  Section	  4).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Here,	  relevant	  information	  is	  that	  which	  –	  if	  acted	  on	  –	  will	  influence	  the	  animal’s	  evolutionary	  fitness.	  
2.3	  Abstracting	  information	  	  Usually	   information	   is	   acquired	   in	   a	   format	   that	   is	   only	   of	   restricted	   use.	   Finding	  generalisations	  across	  cases,	  using	  abstraction,	  extends	  the	  use,	  though	  usually	  only	  within	  a	  range	  of	  contexts	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  learning	  situations.	  However,	  after	  a	  succession	   of	   changes,	   making	   stored	   structures	   usable	   but	   very	   particular	   and	  shallow,	  learners	  (unconsciously)	  reorganise	  the	  information	  into	  a	  new	  generative	  form.	  This	  is	  both	  more	  economical	  and	  more	  powerful	  because	  it	  is	  wider	  in	  scope	  –	   a	   sort	   of	   deductive	   system	   in	   which	   novel	   conclusions	   can	   be	   derived.	   This	  illustrates	  what	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith	  (1992)	  calls	  “Representational	  Redescription”.	  The	  transition	   in	   human	   children	   from	   using	   empirically	   learnt	  words	   and	   phrases	   to	  using	   generative	   syntax,	   allowing	   a	   potentially	   infinite	   class	   of	   sentences	   to	   be	  understood	  or	  generated,	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  example.	  As	  a	  simpler	  example,	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  generative	  system	  potentially	  allows	  animals	   to	  apply	  elements	  of	  existing	  knowledge	  about	  how	   to	  perform	  a	  particular	  action	   in	  one	   context	   to	  an	  entirely	  new	  context,	   in	  order	  to	  access	  a	  new	  food	  resource	  (e.g.	  Gajdon	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  mechanisms	   underlying	   the	   processes	   of	   abstraction	   are	   still	   subject	   to	   debate.	  Sidman	   (see	   Sidman,	   1990;	  2000	   for	   example)	  has	  proposed	   that	   several	   kinds	  of	  concepts	   (such	  as	   equivalence	   relationships	   like	   symmetry	   and	   transitivity)	  might	  be	  acquired	  purely	  as	  a	   consequence	  of	   reinforcement	  contingencies.	  Experiments	  using	   successive	   matching	   in	   pigeons	   (Urcuioli,	   2008)	   support	   this	   theory	   and	  further	   suggest	   that	   pigeons	   might	   be	   forming	   stimulus-­‐temporal	   location	  compounds.	   However,	   these	   experiments	   involved	   a	   small	   number	   of	   familiar,	  simple	  stimuli,	  presented	  in	  tightly	  constrained	  learning	  environments.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  that	  sort	  of	  concept	   learning	  could	  enable	  an	  animal	   to	  classify	  situations	  encountered	   in	   the	   wild	   where	   the	   configuration	   of	   details	   can	   be	   novel	   and	  consequences	  of	  possible	  actions	  need	  to	  be	  worked	  out	  rather	  than	  retrieved	  from	  memory.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  reinforcement	  might	  be	  in	  such	  cases,	  nor	  can	  the	  mechanisms	   proposed	   by	   Sidman	   (1990;	   2000)	   readily	   explain	   Karmiloff-­‐Smith’s	  (1992)	  representational	  redescription.	  	  While	   Rover	   would	   initially	   have	   to	   learn	   anew	   how	   to	   handle	   each	   new	   kind	   of	  material	  it	  handled,	  it	  might	  eventually	  represent	  them	  in	  more	  abstract	  categories.	  This	   would	   allow	   it	   to	   identify	   quickly	   whether	   a	   particular	   material	   is	   in	   the	  category	  that	  requires	  scooping	  or	  grasping,	  for	  example.	  Similarly,	  NCC	  might	  learn	  something	  about	  the	  abstract	  affordances	  of	  hooks,	  enabling	  them	  to	  manufacture	  a	  hook	  from	  a	  novel	  material	  (Weir	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  For	   each	   such	   exploration	   domain,	   Karmiloff-­‐Smith	   (1992)	   suggests	   that	   a)	   the	  learning	   depends	   on	   innate	  mechanisms,	   although	  what	   is	   learnt	   depends	   on	   the	  environment,	   and	   b)	   that	   exploration	   goes	   through	   characteristic	   phases,	   but	  different	   domains	   are	   explored	   at	   different	   ages.	   Finally,	   she	   suggests	   that	   c)	  learning	  within	  a	  domain	  initially	  produces	  behavioural	  competence,	  followed	  by	  a	  succession	   of	   revisions	   of	   what	   is	   learnt.	   This	   reorganises	   and	   re-­‐represents	   the	  information	   to	   generalise	   the	   competence,	   later	   allowing	   the	   competence	   itself	   to	  
become	   an	   object	   of	   attention,	   often	   manifested	   in	   abilities	   to	   answer	   questions	  about	  the	  domain,	  such	  as	  what	  can	  and	  cannot	  occur	  (see	  Section	  4).	  	  	  
2.4	  Extending	  knowledge	  by	  combining	  domains	  	  New	  domains	  can	  be	  composed	  by	  combining	  old	  domains,	  such	  as	  combining	  play	  with	  sand	  and	  play	  with	  water.	  Such	  combinations	  are	  possible	  because	  so	  many	  of	  the	   domains	   involve	   spatial	   structures	   and	   processes:	   actions	   originally	   done	   at	  different	   locations	   or	   times	   can	   be	   done	   together.	   This	   can	   lead	   to	   new	   forms	   of	  interaction	   (e.g.	  Miyata	   et	   al.	   2010).	   In	   some	   cases,	  what	  was	   previously	   learnt	   in	  separate	  domains	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  predicting	  the	  results	  of	  composition.	  In	  other	  cases,	   more	   empirical	   learning	   is	   required,	   followed	   by	   new	   forms	   of	   conceptual	  revision,	  theory	  construction	  and	  meta-­‐cognition.	  For	  example,	  learning	  about	  mud	  after	  learning	  about	  sand	  and	  about	  water.	  	  One	   common	   simplification	   is	   the	   discovery	   that	   two	  domains,	   involving	   different	  perceptual	   contents	   and	   affordances,	   can	   nevertheless	   share	   structures	   and	   be	  unified	   in	  a	  useful	  new	  abstraction.	  This	  can	  create	  new	  domains,	  or	  be	  applied	  to	  existing	  domains.	  Abstractions	   such	  as	  order,	   containment,	   contiguity,	  motion	  and	  causation	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  several	  exploration	  domains,	  but	  showing	  how	  a	  robot	  can	  discover	  and	  use	   them	  has	  yet	   to	  be	  determined.	   It	   is	  not	  clear	  how	  the	  many	  environmental	   properties	   represented	   by	   adults	   as	   numerical	   measures	   (e.g.	  position,	  velocity,	  volume)	  can	  come	  to	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  young	  learner.	  	  
2.5	  Development	  of	  meta-­‐cognition	  	  There	   are	   many	   different	   forms	   of	   meta-­‐cognition	   (e.g.	   Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	   1992	  Chapter	  5;	  Povinelli	  and	  Preuss	  1995),	  but	  in	  this	  paper	  we	  refer	  specifically	  to	  self-­‐directed	  meta-­‐cognition.	   It	  would	  be	  beneficial	   for	  agents	   to	  be	  able	   to	  detect	  and	  monitor	   their	  own	   level	  of	  uncertainty,	   for	  example,	  by	  detecting	   that	   they	  do	  not	  have	   sufficient	   information	   to	   make	   a	   decision,	   However,	   as	   yet	   there	   are	   no	  plausible	  working	  models	  for	  either	  artificial	  agents	  or	  biological	  organisms,	  and	  the	  evidence	   for	  meta-­‐cognition	   of	   this	   kind	   in	   animals	   has	   been	   difficult	   to	   establish	  (see	   Smith,	   2009	   for	   a	   review).	   There	   may	   be	   some	   self-­‐organising	   knowledge	  stores,	  able	  to	  react	  automatically	  to	  changes	  and	  new	  opportunities.	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	   information	   processing	   architecture	  may	   include	   a	   separate	   sub-­‐system,	   with	  meta-­‐cognitive	   competences	   monitoring	   other	   sub-­‐systems'	   behaviour	   and	  detecting	   opportunities	   to	   initiate	  major	   reorganisation	   (e.g.	   Sussman,	   1975).	   For	  example,	  objects	  which	  do	  not	  behave	  as	  the	  agent	  expects	  -­‐	  rocks	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  solid	   but	   crumble	   as	   soon	   as	   Rover	   grasps	   them,	   or	   materials	   which	   bend	   when	  force	  is	  applied	  but	  do	  not	  return	  to	  their	  original	  shape	  when	  released	  by	  a	  NCC	  –	  might	  stimulate	  the	  agent	  to	  learn	  more.	  	  
	  A	   special	   sub-­‐set	   of	   meta-­‐cognitive	   competences	   includes	   sophisticated	   self-­‐criticism	  mechanisms	   that	   can	   drive	   learning,	   such	   as	   improving	   problem-­‐solving	  skills	  (Sussman,	  1975;	  Sloman	  2011b).	  The	  mechanisms	  for	  generating	  new	  forms	  of	  learning	  may	  initially	  be	  genome-­‐based	  products	  of	  evolution,	  but	  their	  effects	  can	  vary	   according	   to	   an	   individual's	   experience.	   Forms	   of	   learning	   can	   develop	  throughout	  life,	  partly	  influenced	  by	  the	  genome	  and	  partly	  by	  what	  has	  been	  learnt	  about	  learning	  itself	  at	  earlier	  stages.	  In	  humans,	  for	  example,	  learning	  about	  more	  advanced	  mathematical	  concepts	  and	  techniques	  requires	  developing	  the	  ability	  to	  represent	   more	   and	   more	   complex	   structures	   and	   processes	   using	   new	   forms	   of	  representation,	   such	   as	   propositions	   with	   more	   than	   one	   quantifier,	   and	  increasingly	   complex	   truth-­‐preserving	   transformations.	   These	   types	   of	   learning	  differ	  from	  earlier	  forms	  not	  just	  in	  their	  content,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  structure.	  	  The	  work	  of	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith	   (1992)	  on	   "representational	   re-­‐description"	   suggests	  that,	   in	  some	  cases	  at	   least,	  the	  competences	  gained	  empirically	  during	  a	  period	  of	  learning	  and	  development	  can	  later	  be	  revised	  or	  transformed.	  	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	   to	  determine	  empirically	  whether	   that	   occurs	  by	   a	  process	  of	   internal	   re-­‐organisation	   within	   a	   complex	   form	   of	   representation,	   or	   whether	   it	   requires	   a	  separate	   meta-­‐cognitive	   system.	   Experiments	   in	   AI	   could	   at	   least	   reveal	   some	  alternatives,	  and	  their	  implications	  and	  costs,	  along	  with	  demonstrations	  of	  what	  is	  possible.	  	  	  	  
3 Constraints	  on	  exploration	  and	  information	  processing	  systems	  	  In	   Section	   2	   we	   outlined	   some	   theoretical	   requirements	   of	   an	   exploration	   and	  information	   processing	   system.	   We	   need	   to	   consider	   what	   constraints	   evolution	  imposes	  upon	  such	  systems.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  answer,	  as	  the	  constraints	  depend	  on	  the	  life	  history	  strategy	  of	  the	  species,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  affordances	  of	  the	  individual’s	  niche	  (Greenberg	  and	  Mettke-­‐Hofmann,	  2001;	  Mettke-­‐Hofmann	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  
3.1 Constraints	  on	  energy	  expenditure	  	  Exploration	   requires	   energy	   expenditure,	   on	   which	   there	   is	   strong	   selection	  pressure,	   so	   more	   efficient	   exploration	   strategies	   would	   provide	   a	   selective	  advantage.	   One	  way	   in	  which	   this	  might	   be	   achieved	   is	   by	   combining	   exploration	  with	   other	   activities	   that	   are	   vital	   to	   survival,	   such	   as	   foraging	   (e.g.	   Krebs	   et	   al.,	  1978;	  Cohen	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Houston	  et	  al.,	  this	  issue).	  Since	  Rover	  will	  have	  to	  balance	  time	  (and	  thus	  energy)	  spent	  exploring	  its	  environment	  with	  that	  spent	  completing	  its	   tasks,	   it	   would	   be	   helpful	   to	   have	   some	  mechanism	   for	   collecting	   information	  while	   pursuing	   its	   assigned	   tasks	   (see	   discussion	   in	   Hawes	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   Another	  way	  of	  scheduling	  the	  costs	  of	  exploration	  is	  to	  concentrate	  this	  activity	  into	  periods	  of	  the	  animal’s	   life	  when	  other	  time	  pressures	  are	  low.	  For	  instance,	  many	  altricial	  species	  have	  an	  intense	  period	  of	  exploratory	  or	  play	  activity	  as	  infants	  or	  juveniles,	  when	  parents	  provide	  food	  and	  protection	  (Power,	  2000;	  Held	  and	  Špinka,	  2011).	  
	  
3.2 Constraints	  on	  timing	  of	  exploration	  	  A	   framework	   comparing	   patterns	   of	   development	   and	   learning	   (Chappell	   and	  Sloman,	   2007;	   Sloman	   and	   Chappell,	   2005),	   distinguishes	   pre-­‐configured	  competences	  (present	  at	  birth)	  and	  meta-­‐configured	  competences	  (based	  on	  forms	  of	   development	   that	   are	   the	   products	   of	   previous	   learning).	   These	   differ	   in	   their	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  Pre-­‐configured	  competences	  emerge	  quickly,	  but	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  variable.	  Meta-­‐configured	  competences	  are	  more	  variable,	  and	  can	  be	  better	  tailored	  to	  new	  environments,	  but	  require	  more	   time	  to	  develop.	  This	  means	   that	   they	  are	  potentially	   risky	   for	   the	   animal	   if	   the	   competence	   is	   required	   early	   in	   life	   (e.g.	  predator	  escape	  behaviour).	  	  	  As	  mentioned	   earlier,	   altricial	   NCC	   seem	   to	   spend	   at	   least	   some	   of	   their	   juvenile	  period	   exploring	   tool-­‐related	   objects	   and	   actions	   (Kenward	   et	   al.,	   2006)	   and	  learning	  how	   to	  use	   and	   control	   tools.	   In	   contrast,	   Rover	   is	   effectively	   a	   precocial	  agent	  with	  no	  parents	  nearby	  to	  shelter	  and	  protect	  it.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  spend	  an	  initial	  period	  acquiring	  skills	  close	  to	  a	  known,	  safe	  location	  before	  carrying	  out	  real	  tasks	  further	  way.	  	  While	  the	  brain	   is	  undergoing	  development	  during	  a	  protracted	  period	  of	  parental	  dependency,	   neural	   connectivity	   can	   be	   shaped	   by	   the	   current	   environment,	   as	  happens	  in	  humans	  (Supekar	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  some	  non-­‐human	  animals	  (e.g.	  song	  learning	   in	   birds:	   De	   Groof	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   However,	   this	   may	   raise	   additional	  problems	   if	   the	   re-­‐organisation	   requires	   some	   systems	   to	   have	   developed	   or	  matured	  before	  others	  (Bushnell	  and	  Boudreau,	  1993).	  	  The	   relationship	  between	   life-­‐history	   strategy	   and	   exploration	   costs	   and	   timing	   is	  complex.	  Longer-­‐lived	  species	  have	  more	  time	  to	  acquire	  sophisticated	  competences	  through	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment,	  but	  they	  may	  also	  have	  a	  greater	  need	  for	  such	   competences,	   because	   they	   may	   experience	   more	   environmental	   variability	  during	   their	   life-­‐span.	   In	   turn,	   the	   complexity	   of	   their	   competences	   generates	  another	   source	   of	   variability	   (Sterelny,	   2007).	   These	   types	   of	   species	   extend	   and	  fine-­‐tune	   their	   knowledge	   throughout	   life	   and	   neophilia	   is	   often	   present	   into	   late	  adulthood	  (e.g.	  parrots;	  Luescher	  2006).	  	  	  
3.3 Constraints	  on	  level	  of	  abstraction	  	  Some	  complex	  environments	  contain	  self-­‐repeating	  elements,	  leading	  to	  redundancy	  of	  information.	  More	  abstract	  concepts	  are	  applicable	  in	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  contexts.	  However,	  they	  may	  lead	  to	  over-­‐generalisation	  errors	  (Marcus	  et	  al.,	  1992),	  such	  as	  wrongly	  identifying	  a	  camel	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  horse	  (Tenenbaum	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  impact	  of	  those	  errors	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  false	  positives	  and	  false	  negatives.	  	  If	   the	   cost	   of	   false	  positives	   is	   high,	   abstraction	  may	  be	   constrained.	   For	   example,	  Rover	  might	  use	  an	  abstraction	  formed	  from	  a	  constellation	  of	  topological	  features	  
to	   identify	   safe	   surfaces	   to	   move	   on,	   avoiding	   having	   to	   probe	   the	   surface	  continuously.	   However,	   if	   it	   wrongly	   identifies	   a	   darker	   region	   as	   a	   type	   of	   rock	  rather	   than	   a	   hole,	   the	   consequences	   could	   be	   serious.	   Conversely,	   if	   the	   costs	   of	  false	  positives	  are	  low	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  not	  having	  to	  respond	  differently	  to	  each	  item	   in	   a	   broad	   category	   are	   high,	   then	   processes	   favouring	   abstraction	   will	   be	  under	  strong	  selection	  pressure.	  	  However,	  not	  all	   exploration	  domains	  are	  equally	  amenable	   to	  abstraction.	  Simple	  domains	  with	   very	   low	  variation	   in	   relevant	   information	   allow	  a	   small	   number	  of	  abstractions	   to	   suffice,	  with	  a	   correspondingly	   small	  number	  of	   associations	   to	  be	  learnt.	   At	   the	   other	   extreme	   in	   domains	   with	   high	   variation,	   there	   will	   be	   many	  potential	   invariances	   to	   learn,	   particularly	   when	   the	   variation	   arises	   from	  complexity.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   in	   these	   situations,	   in	   which	   complex	   structures	   contain	  simpler	  components	  in	  various	  relationships,	  that	  learners	  have	  the	  most	  to	  gain	  by	  going	  beyond	  mere	  abstraction	  and	  developing	  a	  generative	  theory	  (e.g.	  a	  theory	  of	  syntax	  in	  human	  language).	  One	  important	  use	  of	  exploration	  is	  discovering	  the	  type	  of	   structural	   variability	   in	   a	   domain	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   discovering	   the	   generative	  theory	  that	  unifies	  the	  varied	  possibilities.	  	  	  
4 How	  do	  animals	  fulfil	  the	  requirements	  of	  exploration?	  	  Following	  our	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  requirements	  of	  an	  information	  processing	   system	   and	   the	   evolutionary	   constraints	   it	   faces,	   and	   the	   increasing	  evidence	  that	  –	  at	  least	  in	  humans	  -­‐	  exploration	  is	  not	  random	  (Gibson,	  1988;	  Cook	  et	   al.,	   2011),	   we	   propose	   that	   exploration	   is	   composed	   of	   structured	   behavioural	  strategies	  supported	  by	  specific	  sensory	  and	  motor	  predispositions.	  Here	  we	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  features	  we	  could	  investigate	  in	  testing	  this	  proposal	  in	  animals.	  	  
4.1 Pre-­‐dispositions:	  'safe'	  defaults	  	  There	  are	  certain	  aspects	  of	   the	  physical	  world	   that	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  constants,	  such	   as	   the	   effect	   of	   gravity,	   the	  properties	   of	   contact,	   solidity	   and	   connectedness	  and	  of	  biological	  movement	  or	  agency.	  We	  can	  expect	  many	  non-­‐human	  animals	  to	  possess	  mechanisms	  that	  cope	  with	  or	  use	  these	  features	  as	  defaults	  from	  birth	  or	  hatching.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  at	  least	  some	  organisms	  have	  such	  pre-­‐dispositions,	  which	  are	  fine-­‐tuned	  and	  built	  upon	  with	  experience	  (e.g.	  Cacchione	  and	  Call,	  2010;	  Cacchione	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kundey	  et	  al.,	  2009	  on	  solidity).	  The	  work	  of	  Elizabeth	  Spelke	  and	  others	  (Spelke	  and	  Kinzler,	  2007)	  has	  argued	  that	  human	  infants	  have	  systems	  representing	  actions,	  objects,	  number,	  space	  and	  possibly	  social	  partners,	  although	  the	   developmental	   standpoint	   of	   Karmiloff-­‐Smith	   challenges	   some	   of	   the	  conclusions.	   Developing	   alternative	   working	   designs	   should	   help	   us	   clarify	  alternative	  hypotheses.	  This	  has	  begun	  with	   some	  non-­‐human	  animal	   studies	   (e.g.	  Bird	  and	  Emery,	  2010;	  Funk	  2002;	  O'Connell	  and	  Dunbar,	  2005).	  	  
4.2 Behaviour	  structured	  to	  increase	  information	  gained	  	  Agents	  can	  gain	  valuable	  information	  from	  perceiving	  and	  acting	  on	  objects	  around	  them.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  human	  infants’	  understanding	  of	  actions	  and	  object	  properties	   derives	   from	   the	   combination	   of	   their	   exploratory	   behaviour	   and	   the	  information	  processing	  systems	  generating	  and	  modifying	  their	  behaviour	  (Gibson,	  1988;	   Gibson	   and	   Pick,	   2000;	   Piaget,	   1952;	   Rochat,	   2004).	   In	   turn,	   the	  representations	  that	  result	  from	  such	  exploratory	  activity	  alter	  and	  direct	  the	  kinds	  of	  actions	  infants	  perform	  on	  objects	  (Perone	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  If	   the	   function	   of	   such	   exploratory	   behaviour	   is	   to	   gather	   information,	   we	  would	  expect	  the	  form	  of	  exploratory	  behaviour	  (and	  the	  information	  processing	  systems	  underlying	  it)	  to	  change	  with	  context,	  maximising	  opportunities	  for	  gaining	  relevant	  information.	   In	  human	   infants,	   the	   types	  of	  manipulation	  used	  alter	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  affordances	  of	  a	   series	  of	   toys	  change:	   looking	  at	  and	   fingering	  of	  objects	  increases	  when	   texture	   changes,	   but	   actions	   such	   as	   rotation	   and	   transferring	   the	  object	   between	   the	   hands	   increases	   when	   shape	   changes	   (Ruff,	   1984).	   Similarly,	  infants	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   transfer	   an	   object	   between	   hands	   or	   finger	   the	   surface	  while	  looking	  at	  it,	  but	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  rotate	  the	  object	  while	  mouthing	  it	  (Ruff	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  Each	  kind	  of	  action	  generates	  perceptual	  changes	  that	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  the	   sensory	   modality	   used,	   and	   may	   maximise	   the	   individuals’	   opportunities	   for	  detecting	  relevant	  features.	  	  There	   has	   been	   much	   less	   work	   on	   the	   form	   and	   function	   of	   the	   information	  gathering	   aspects	   of	   exploration	   in	   non-­‐human	   animals	   (Inglis,	   1983;	   Inglis	   et	   al.,	  2001;	  Power,	  2000;	  see	  Kacelnik,	  1987	  and	  Renner,	  1990	  for	  critiques),	  as	  opposed	  to	   the	   current	   or	   future	   fitness	  benefits	   of	   behaviour	  usually	   referred	   to	   as	   “play”	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Bekoff	  and	  Byers,	  1998;	  Held	  and	  Špinka,	  2011).	  What	  we	  do	  know,	  suggests	  that	  their	  sensorimotor	  behaviour	  acts	  to	  increase	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	   of	   information	   gained.	   Many	   species	   show	   active	   information	   gathering	  (Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	   1992).	   Rats,	   for	   instance,	   alter	   the	   speed	   and	   pattern	   of	   their	  whisking	  behaviour	  to	  increase	  information	  about	  shape	  and	  texture	  of	  objects	  that	  they	  contact	  with	  their	  vibrissae	  (Grant	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  which	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  modelling	  the	  behaviour	  in	  a	  robot	  (Pearson	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  So,	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  rats’	  whisking	  behaviour	  are	  “designed”	  in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  detecting	  important	  environmental	  features.	  	  It	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  exploratory	  behaviour	  from	  executive	  action:	  is	  the	  animal	  lifting	  an	  object	  because	  it	  is	  trying	  to	  transport	  it,	  or	  is	  it	  gaining	  information	  about	  the	  object’s	  weight?	  Of	  course,	  it	  may	  be	  able	  to	  fulfil	  both	  goals	  at	  the	  same	  time	   (e.g.	   Elner	   and	  Hughes,	   1978),	   but	   it	   can	   be	   difficult	   to	   determine	  when	   (or	  whether)	   an	   animal	   is	   collecting	   perceptual	   information,	   without	   having	   more	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  sensory	  realm	  (Demery	  et	  al.,	  in	  press).	  We	  need	  more	  detailed	   information	  on	  animals’	   sensory	   systems,	   as	  well	   as	  more	  
reliable	   behavioural	   or	   physiological	   ‘markers’	   of	   exploratory	   behaviour	   in	   non-­‐human	  animals.	  	  
4.3 Exploration	  directed	  towards	  novelty	  	  Neophilia	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  an	   important	  aspect	  of	  exploration	   in	  non-­‐human	  animals	  (Greenberg	  and	  Mettke-­‐Hofmann,	  2001;	  Mettke-­‐Hofmann	  et	  al.,	  2002),	  and	  is	   often	   associated	  with	   the	   juvenile	   phase	   of	   an	   animal’s	   development	   (Heinrich,	  1995).	  Novel	  objects,	  places	  and	  events	  are	  –	  by	  definition	  –	  items	  about	  which	  the	  animal	   does	   not	   have	   adequate	   information,	   and	   so	   animals	   should	   prioritise	  interaction	  with	  these	  items.	  In	  particular,	  animals	  in	  dynamic	  environments	  might	  use	  exploration	  to	  experiment	  with	  strategies	  or	  behaviours	  that	  are	  effective	  in	  the	  current	  environmental	  context	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  For	   instance,	   Ruff	   (1986)	   hypothesised	   that	   if	   the	   main	   function	   of	   “examining”	  behaviour	   in	   human	   infants	   is	   to	   gather	   information,	   it	   should	   a)	   decrease	   in	  frequency	  with	  exposure	  to	  a	  particular	  object,	  and	  b)	  occur	  before	  other	  behaviours	  when	  an	  object	   is	  new.	   She	   found	   that	  both	  hypotheses	  were	  upheld	   and	   that	   the	  latency	   and	   duration	   of	   examining	   seemed	   to	   indicate	   different	   features	   of	   the	  process,	   with	   latency	   reflecting	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   activate	   the	   information	  gathering	  system.	  	  Not	   all	   aspects	   of	   novelty	   may	   be	   equally	   salient.	   For	   example,	   Perone	   and	  colleagues	   (2008)	   presented	   infants	   with	   a	   sequence	   of	   images	   depicting	   a	   hand	  acting	  on	  a	  colourful	  toy,	  which	  produced	  a	  sound	  (e.g.	  a	  purple	  sphere	  that	  squeaks	  when	  squeezed),	  followed	  by	  an	  image	  in	  which	  either	  the	  action-­‐sound	  pair	  or	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  object	  changed.	  They	  found	  that	  infants	  attended	  more	  to	  changes	  in	  action	   than	   to	  changes	   in	  appearance.	   In	  evolutionary	   terms,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  why	  such	  differences	  in	  salience	  exist,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  that	  changes	  in	  appearance	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  object	  or	  event	  function,	  than	  changes	  in	  action.	  	  
4.4 Active	  'testing'	  when	  expectations	  are	  violated	  	  If	  an	  organism’s	  current	  empirical	  observations	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  information	  it	  has	  collected,	  it	  should	  re-­‐initiate	  exploration	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  discrepancy:	  do	  we	  observe	   this	   process	   in	   biological	   organisms?	   There	   is	   increasing	   evidence	   that	  human	  children	  can	  use	  a	  conditional	   intervention	  principle	   to	   learn	  about	  causes	  and	   are	   sensitive	   to	   ambiguous	   information	   (Gopnik,	   1996;	   Gopnik	   and	   Schulz,	  2004;	   Schulz	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Tenenbaum	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   Furthermore,	   children’s	  exploration	  appears	  to	  be	  systematic	  in	  many	  respects,	  and	  is	  thus	  capable	  of	  both	  detecting	   discrepancies	   between	   observed	   data	   and	   stored	   information,	   and	   of	  resolving	  those	  discrepancies.	  For	  example,	  when	  children	  are	  shown	  that	  blocks	  of	  a	  certain	  category	  (defined	  by	  a	  linguistic	  label	  or	  by	  appearance)	  stick	  magnetically	  to	  a	  board,	  they	  test	  the	  properties	  of	  new	  blocks	  more	  extensively	  when	  they	  find	  
that	   properties	   vary	   within	   the	   category	   than	   between	   categories	   (Schulz	   et	   al.,	  2008).	   There	   are	   several	   different,	   inter-­‐linked	   processes	   at	   work	   here.	   The	  individual	  needs	  to	  detect	  that	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  is	  surprising	  and	  then	  begin	  exploration,	   focussing	   on	   resolving	   the	   discrepancy,	   which	   may	   involve	   re-­‐organisation,	  or	  other	  changes	  in	  representations.	  	  	  Do	   any	   non-­‐human	   animals	   show	   similar	   ‘testing’	   behaviours?	   There	   seems	   to	   be	  evidence	  that	  a	  number	  of	  taxa	  (e.g.	  apes,	  rats	  and	  dogs)	  can	  use	  information	  from	  a	  number	   of	   sources	   to	   make	   causal	   inferences.	   Some	   can	   use	   evidence	   from	   the	  object	   itself	   (auditory	   information,	   displacement	   of	   other	   objects,	   weight	   etc.:	  Blaisdell	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Bräuer	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Call,	  2004;	  Hanus	  and	  Call,	  2008),	  through	  social	  cues	  (e.g.	  Povinelli	  et	  al.,	  1990),	  or	  by	  exclusion	  (Aust	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Call,	  2006;	  Hill	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  However,	  these	  experiments	  relied	  on	  animals	  observing	  the	  state	  of	   the	   world,	   or	   watching	   others	   perform	   actions	   on	   objects.	   As	   far	   as	   we	   know,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  studies	  on	  whether	  non-­‐human	  animals	  spontaneously	  perform	  their	  own	  ‘tests’,	  as	  shown	  for	  human	  children	  	  (Schulz	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  However,	  some	  studies	  have	  manipulated	  certain	  environmental	  stimuli	  and	  measured	  exploratory	  behavioural	   sequences	   (Kuba	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Renner	   1990;	   Bekoff	   1975),	   which	  revealed	   behaviour,	   at	   least	   in	   rats	   and	   octopuses,	   that	   appears	   to	   be	   similar	   to	  human	   children.	  We	  would	   predict	   that	   non-­‐human	   animals,	   like	   children,	   would	  become	  less	  repetitive	  in	  their	  exploratory	  actions	  as	  they	  develop.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  would	  show	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  exploratory	  behaviours	  rather	   than	  simply	  repeating	  a	  small	  number	  of	  actions	  on	  the	  same	  part	  of	  the	  environment,	  because	  they	  learn	  what	  kinds	  of	  actions	  will	  be	  most	  effective	  in	  each	  situation.	  	  	  	  	  
5 Conclusions	  	  We	  have	  discussed	  information	  gathering	  in	  biological	  and	  artificial	  organisms,	  and	  ways	  in	  which	  taking	  a	  ‘designer	  stance’	  (Dennett,	  1981;	  McCarthy,	  2008)	  can	  help	  to	   both	   clarify	   theoretical	   issues	   and	   suggest	   lines	   of	   enquiry	   for	   behavioural	  experiments	   on	   humans	   and	   non-­‐human	   animals	   (Chappell	   and	   Thorpe,	   2010).	  Studying	   exploration	   and	   information	   acquisition	   is	   difficult	   partly	   because	   it	  intersects	  with	   –	   and	  has	   important	   consequences	   for	   –	  many	  other	   aspects	   of	   an	  animal’s	  behaviour.	  It	   is	  part	  of	  learning,	  as	  well	  as	  physical	  maturation,	  and	  it	  can	  help	  to	  provide	  the	  content	  and	  structure	  for	  cognition.	  We	  need	  also	  to	  take	  note	  of	  both	  the	  successes	  and	  mistakes	  of	  an	   individual	   to	  help	   illuminate	  the	  underlying	  processes.	   Understanding	   the	   animal’s	   sensory	   world	   is	   also	   of	   vital	   importance,	  since	   it	  acts	  both	  as	  a	  conduit	  and	  a	   filter	   for	  the	   information	  that	   is	  gathered,	  but	  many	   details	   remain	   to	   be	   studied	   (e.g.	   Demery	   et	   al.,	   in	   press).	   There	   are	   such	  substantial	  differences	  not	  only	  across	  environments,	  but	  also	  between	  and	  within	  species,	   so	   there	   are	   probably	   many	   different	   kinds	   of	   mechanisms	   operating	   in	  combination	   in	   different	   exploration	   domains.	   Future	   research	   should	   investigate	  
how	   all	   these	   elements	   interact	   quantitatively	   and	   qualitatively.	   Demonstrable	  working	  models	  should	  suggest	  new	  research	  questions.	  However,	  some	  questions	  may	   only	   be	   answered	   when	   the	   brain	   mechanisms	   are	   better	   understood	   (e.g.	  Reynolds	  and	  O'Reilly,	  2009).	  	  We	   can	  make	   progress	   on	   the	   theoretical	   issues	   by	   using	   the	   analytical	   tools	   and	  techniques	   from	  AI	   and	   robotics	   (for	   example	  Hawes	   et	   al.	   2010;	  Markram,	  2006;	  Pardowitz	   and	   Dillman,	   2007;	   Saegusa	   et	   al.	   2008;),	   particularly	   to	   analyse	   the	  environmental	   requirements.	   Thinking	   about	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   one	   might	  implement	   such	   features	   in	   a	   robot	   (or	   actually	   building	   a	   robot),	   forces	   one	   to	  consider	  details	  and	  interactions	  that	  may	  otherwise	  have	  been	  overlooked,	  and	  can	  also	   generate	   specific,	   testable	   hypotheses	   for	   behavioural	   tests	   with	   animals	  (Chappell	  and	  Thorpe,	  2010;	  Pearson	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Prescott	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Webb,	  2001).	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